BCAM Seminar Mathematics, Economy and Finance: Voting and Collective Decision-Making - Bargaining and Power
Date: Tue, Dec 9 2008
Location: Euskal Herriko Unibersitatea (EHU/UPV), Sarriko, Basque Country, Spain / Ikerbasque Researcher
Speakers: Annick LARUELLE
Every day thousands of decisions are made by all kinds of committees,
parliaments, councils and boards by a ?yes-no? voting process. Sometimes a
committee can only accept or reject the proposals submitted to it for a decision.
On other occasions, committee members have the possibility of modifying the
proposal and bargaining an agreement prior to the vote. In either case, what rule
should be used if each member acts on behalf of a different sized group? It
seems intuitively clear that if the groups are of different sizes then a symmetric
rule (e.g. the simple majority or unanimity) is not suitable. The question then
arises of what voting rule should be used. Voting and Collective Decision-Making
addresses this and other issues through a study of the theory of bargaining and
voting power, showing how it applies to real decision-making contexts.
parliaments, councils and boards by a ?yes-no? voting process. Sometimes a
committee can only accept or reject the proposals submitted to it for a decision.
On other occasions, committee members have the possibility of modifying the
proposal and bargaining an agreement prior to the vote. In either case, what rule
should be used if each member acts on behalf of a different sized group? It
seems intuitively clear that if the groups are of different sizes then a symmetric
rule (e.g. the simple majority or unanimity) is not suitable. The question then
arises of what voting rule should be used. Voting and Collective Decision-Making
addresses this and other issues through a study of the theory of bargaining and
voting power, showing how it applies to real decision-making contexts.
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